Social science reconstruction is needed to explain our vital social issues in a theoretical manner.
going to be sublated [Aufhebung] 
at all times. This equals to saying that by incessantly preserving and transcending that which is a given [donné] to it, it will continuously make (in)novations as well according -as adapted -to its own timely needs. LUKÁCS once draw the conclusion (also by reinterpreting the debate between MARX and LASSALLE on the reception of Roman law) according to which it is the ontological perspective that is primordial

is not some accidental and external complementation to law but -be it, characterised as prevailing in ENGELS' time, the case of European continental normativism or the Anglo-Saxon pragmatic casualism or case-law method (not to extend our exemplification to other legal traditions as well) -it is one of the original factors of what can be truly termed as the law's social existence.
Self-realising homogenisations are being built by the partial complexes on the heterogeneity of everyday practice unceasingly. It is the judicial process as particular reality-(re)construction from the analysis of which the author has arrived at the ontologising reformulation of autopoietic theory, originally drafted in Chile in explanation of the biological reproduction of cells. As the author concluded therefrom, that what is alleged as following social patterns is reproduction and production at the same time, an individual combination of preservation and (in)novation up to the point of its being recognised just as exemplary pattern-following by its hic et nunc social environment, and thereby also authenticated as a given instance of the reconventionalisation of the underlying convention. Or, in law, actual decision making can only be modelled by the logic of problem solving, with relatively open chances and within a relatively open referential frame, upon which the logic of justification is only building as added to the former phase to phase posteriorly, as a kind of feedback in test of control; all this running against the usual stand of legal theories which, dreaming about some mechanicity in pattern-following, are only able and willing to report on the implementation of the law's textuality, its sheer realisation in practice. Again, the judicial decision is envisioned as a result concludingly drawn and derived from the letters of the law (in a manner similar to the inner necessity of chemical extraction) -consequently, insofar as the 'right answer' is reached, one without alternatives -, albeit there are no in-built necessities here. LUKÁCS may have been of the same opinion since he simply designated the settling of the conflict of involved interests through the law's system of fulfilment [Verfüllungssystem] as manipulation.
For comprehension [Verständnis] is again an autopoietical process itself, within the general scheme of any hermeneutic process (unless we think in the possibility of a Robinsonian being, already excluded by LUKÁCS): it will reach its given form as it will result from the social game (and its just-so-being [Gerade-So-Sein] DOI: 10.17516/1997 DOI: 10.17516/ -1370 DOI: 10.17516/ -2015 DOI: 10.17516/ -8-10-2002 DOI: 10.17516/ -2017 Research area: law.
I. Lukács and his Ontology of the Social Being
Categories
The synthesising work of GeorGe Lukács (1976) made it clear at its time already (Varga 2012a Objektivierung] can at all emerge and may turn into an overwhelming power in society, and which can produce, in the course of its own selfdevelopment, the potential and the social reality of reification [Verdinglichung] that can yet be accepted as functional in social workings, and of alienation [Entfremdung] , which is already to be seen as dysfunctional.
It is known at the latest from the classical time of Maine's inquiry into The Ancient Law one and a half centuries ago (Maine 1876 [Paulson 1992 ] and Pound's sociologism having once made the distinction between 'law in books' and 'law in action' [Pound 1910 ]), analysis requires the presumption of some construction of the subject, on the one hand, albeit it is widely known that actual operation will always break it through, on the other (Varga 1973 
Person and Society
For comprehension [Verständnis] is again an autopoietical process within the general scheme of any hermeneutic process (unless we think in terms of a Robinsonian being, single, and without social memory, as from the beginning excluded by Lukács). Comprehension will result from the social game 5 that just happens to occur in the given audience (PereLMan 1997, 36) . As to social games of both the heterogeneous and the homogenised fields of action, within which also the simultaneous social interaction of "having a meaning and giving a meaning" (Perelman 1962 ) is to take place, well, in point of principle everyone may take part in them and everyone may contribute to actually shaping them (even if this usually is the prime burden and privilege -and also responsibility -of professionals with specific competences in modern societies). No doubt that, on the final analysis, the whole process will exactly lead to the result which is still defensible in the given environment as the actual resolution of the conflict of interests involved. This is so because this is the solution that can yet be -aware of the predispositions commonly shared -successfully conventionalised, that is, acknowledged in the given medium, as the instance of pattern-following individually actualised hic et nunc. Accordingly, the personal responsibility of the decision maker is acutely prevalent in each case here as well.
In fact, we are all accountable -independently of the fact that, by transferring responsibility to the quasi-automatic self-operation of reified structures, we are not used to make it ascribable to anyone in person.
Or, all we act as genuine actors of social games, not simply as imputed puppet entities.
In the ontology of natural and social beings In sum, we are unavoidably responsible for ourselves and for our human destiny, including the how and why we operate our constructs, humanly made for humans' freely selectible best use.
II. Outlines of an Ontology of Law
Foundational Notions
Reconsidering all the above as reflected on law (Varga 1984) , social existence is taken as an irreversible and unbroken process. In this process all that comes about will leave its mark by going to, or drawn in conclusion within, a logified normative scheme (Varga 2000 (Varga & 1994 .
As to its nature, the norm structure developed by the over-dominant state is a teleological projection which fails to formulate the underlying target that is socially desired to reach (Varga 1971 . In order to guarantee unequivocality by excluding mere questionability, it formulates the instrumental behaviour defined by the legislator as the target itself that is to be reached and sanctioned. This is by which the law stipulates the Tatsache -the aggregate of those facts that may constitute a case in law 6 -so that average social attitudes can be foreplanned and effectively 
Objectification, Reification, Alienation
Objectification, reification and alienation 
III. Conclusion
All kinds of "artificial human construction" now (Varga 1995 (Varga & 2008b . This is to message that even the Rule of Law ideal may corrupt by the simple gesture of a blind or overdimensioned use (Varga 2011d This is the reason why classical comparative law, conceived of as the mere extension of national legal positivisms themselves, is to be transcended-or, at least, to be complemented to-by the comparative investigation of legal cultures and of the judicial mind (Varga ed. 1992; Varga 2007b According to the definition Eisler (1904) , "Tatsache (zuerst bei herder) ist das, was durch das Denken sicher als Erfahrungsinhalt, als Bestandteil der gesetzlichen Ordnung der Dinge und Ereignisse feststeht. Die »Tatsachen« als solche sind nicht einfach »gegeben«, sondern müssen erst auf Grund der Erfahrung methodisch-denkend gesetzt, konstatiert werden." As to its context (Gschnitzer 1992 
